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bissue known to the public. An unknown issue can never be bresolved; a known one has at least some chance. bOur second premise was that no issue could be brought to bthe attention of the news media, and hence to the con- bsciousness of the world, without noise, gimmickry, and the bkind of attention-catching that is axiomatic in the world of bthe media. Newspapers and television networks are both out bto sell themselves to the public and they give the public that bwhich they think the public wants: excitement, drama, in- bterest. Like it or not, it is not the pleasant or scrupulously brespectable that is featured on the front page of a paper or bflashed on the screen of a television set. It was never the beducational program of the JDL that brought reporters bstreaming but rather the bombs, the guns, the violence. We bknew what the news media were and so we intended to use bthem to headline the plight of Soviet Jews. In a word, they bwanted to use the JDL to sell papers, so we decided to use bthem by letting them use us—on behalf of the Jews of bRussia. bThirdly, we knew that the courageous efforts of the hand- bful of Soviet Jewish militants had begun the struggle and bwere vital to it. These people had to know that they were not bforgotten and that their fight had a good chance of winning. bWe knew that every issue of Pravda or Izvestia that con- bdemned the JDL boosted the morale of the Jewish activists band that every broadcast by Israel’s Kol Yisroel LaGola, bRadio Free Europe, or the Voice of America which de- bscribed the activities of the activists on their behalf was music bto their ears. To know that someone “outside” cares enough babout you to risk himself is the sweetest news that a prisoner bcan ever hear. bFourth, and most important, the violence was aimed at bthe Achilles’ heel of the Soviets. Unlike the fools who be- blieved that the JDL were fools and who looked upon JDL bviolence in a superficial and simplistic manner, we never bbelieved that the Soviets were frightened by JDL violence. bOne could murder a Soviet diplomat and, by itself, that act bwould not affect the Kremlin. But JDL violence was aimed bnot at the physical fears of the Soviets, but at their interests. b
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