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bretreat and face catastrophe while the Arab star ascends, listen bto the two voices; listen to the contrast. One, the Arab voice, is bshrill, loud, brazen, confident. The other, the Jewish voice, is bdefensive, apologetic, guilt-ridden. Between two such ad- bversaries there is no contest. The Arabs have a definite goal, and btheir programs are unabashedly aimed at it. The Jews, beset by bcontradictions, set up schizophrenic plans that go rushing off bmadly in opposite directions. The results are obvious. bIf Israel would be honest and state the problem truthfully band starkly, world Jewry would understand. But if, on the one bhand, it denies a problem and then takes “anti-liberal” actions bto solve it, what is anyone to think? bThere are Jews who understand the desperate nature of the bproblem and the need to deal with it boldly. It was this under- bstanding that led General Avigdor Ben-Gal to characterize the bArabs of the Galilee as “a cancer.” His reprimand by Begin’s bminister of defense, Ezer Weizman, was only further evidence of bthe fearful lack of direction and firmness in Israel today. bPerhaps the clearest and boldest perception of the problem bwas that of Yisrael Koenig, representative of the Interior bMinistry in the north. In a secret memorandum sent to Prime bMinister Rabin in 1976, Koenig warned that an Arab majority bin the Galilee would threaten Israeli sovereignty in the region. bAs an example of the problem, Koenig pointed out that in 1974 ba mere 759 Jews were added to the Galilee population as against b9,035 Arabs! He called for the following actions to be taken: to bsettle Jews in heavily populated Arab areas; to limit the number bof Arab university students and encourage them to study outside bthe country, then make it difficult for them to return; to cut bsharply national insurance payments to Arabs; and to limit em- bployment opportunities for them. bKoenig’s plan, as good as it was, was unfortunately not bnearly the necessary answer. But it was drafted with knowledge bof the guilt-ridden lack of a sense of national self-preservation bthat gripped Israeli Jews and that prevented an even more vigor- bous and effective plan from being adopted. In the end, even bKoenig and his plan were the targets of the disoriented, confused bliberals. Thus, the Jerusalem Post (September 9, 1976) called it “a bscheme tainted with nationalist fanaticism.” Mapam Knesset bmember Aharon Efrat called for Koenig to be fired. Tourism b
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